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The current “buzzword” among leaders is “transparency.”  Hardly a day goes by that a group leader 
(politician, manager, or administrator) doesn’t state that he values transparency and will provide full 
disclosure of his information and actions.  This project tests experimentally whether or not leaders, when 
given a choice, actually reveal a preference for transparency. Our experiment is based on a theoretical model 
by Komai, Stegeman, and Hermalin (2007). Fifteen subjects are randomly assigned to five groups of three.  
Each group separately participates in an investment game with three possible return scenarios (high, average, 
and low) that are equally likely to happen. Investing in the low-return scenario is not profitable to either 
individual group members or the whole group. In the average-return scenario, group well-being is 
maximized if all the group members invest in the project, but full cooperation may not be achieved simply 
because the dominant strategy of the individuals is to free ride on others. In the high-return scenario full 
cooperation is also optimal for the group, but subjects may or may not coordinate on full cooperation 
because they may fail to coordinate their efforts with the others.  We consider a leader-follower setting. Only 
one member of the group (the leader) observes the scenario. The leader moves before the rest of the group 
members and first decides whether or not to invest in the project.  The leader then chooses between two 
information regimes:  revealing his decision and the return scenario to the rest of the group or revealing his 
decision but not the return scenario.  Absent any information provided by their leader, followers know only 
the possible return scenarios and their likelihoods. They do not know which scenario is assigned to their 
group. Given the leaders’ information choices and investment decisions, the relevant information will be 
conveyed to the followers. The followers then will separately and simultaneously decide whether or not to 
invest in the project (followers do not know anything about the different information regimes). This is 
realistic in many real-world circumstances because in many business or political environments the leaders 
have exclusive access to critical information and are in charge of deciding whether or not to reveal the details 
of their information and actions to their potential followers; in many circumstances it is practically difficult 
for the followers to verify the real information or the leaders’ actions.  
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Are Claims Of Transparency All They Are Cracked Up To Be? 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The current “buzzword” among leaders is “transparency.”  Hardly a day goes by that a group leader 
(politician, manager, or administrator) doesn‟t state that he values transparency and will provide full disclosure of 
his information and actions.  Schwarz (2010) writes that “[T]he definition of „transparency‟ is to share all relevant 
information in a way that is timely and valid.  Being transparent means sharing the reasoning and intent underlying 
your statements, questions and actions (p. 56, emphasis added).”   
Deloitte (2008, 2010) Ethic & Workplace Surveys highlight the importance of transparency for followers.  
In the 2010 survey, 46% of respondents said a lack of leader transparency would cause them to seek new 
employment.  Thirty-two percent ranked transparency most important in building trust in the workplace.  In the 2008 
survey, 72% cited transparency‟s role in creating a more engaging and productive workplace. Bennis (2009) argues 
that a lack of transparency can be a serious problem, lowering morale; providing information boosts both morale and 
performance.  Shaffer (1994) argues there is a shift from patriarchy to partnership and that empowerment and higher 
productivity require the sharing of information.  Wilson (2009) contends that if leaders trust and look out for their 
employees, employees are more engaged and more willing to expend discretionary effort.   
Vogelgesang and Lester (2009) argue that leader transparency includes “…sharing relevant information 
during interactions with followers (p.253).”  Leaders who share relevant information are perceived as more 
“authentic” and followers are more likely to be loyal to authentic leaders.  Sharing information creates common 
goals, providing followers something they can be loyal to.  Transparency builds trust, follower engagement and 
ultimately enhances follower performance.  
Norman et al. (2010) offers empirical evidence consistent with these arguments.   Their work examines the 
linkage between transparency and trust in the leader.  The authors conduct a field experiment with a 2x2 between-
group design.  There are four leadership scenario conditions concerning company downsizing.  Three hundred four 
working adults were described a fictitious organization on the verge of downsizing.  Subjects read one of four 
variations of a script involving the leader‟s positive psychological capacities (high or low) and transparency (high or 
low).  Subjects then completed a survey rating leader trustworthiness and effectiveness.  Leaders with high positive 
psychological capacities and high transparency were rated as significantly more trustworthy and effective.  
What the literature fails to address is:  How is a follower to know if his or her leader is actually being 
transparent or is just engaging in cheap talk?  A leader‟s claim that the information provided followers is complete 
and true is not verifiable before the followers must act; the completeness and veracity can only be determined after 
the fact.  This project tests experimentally whether or not leaders, when given a choice, actually reveal a preference 
for transparency (i.e. they reveal all relevant information to their followers).
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2.  THE EXPERIMENT 
 
We design our experiment based on a theoretical model by Komai et al. (2007).  Fifteen subjects are 
randomly assigned to five groups of three.
2  Each group separately participates in a one-shot, collective action, 
investment game with three possible return scenarios (high, average, and low) that are equally likely to happen (see 
Table 1). Investing in the low-return scenario (S3) is not profitable for either individual group members or the whole 
group. In the average-return scenario (S2), group well-being is maximized if all group members invest in the project, 
but full cooperation may not be achieved because the dominant strategy for each group member is to free ride on 
others. In the high-return scenario (S1), full cooperation is also optimal for the group, but members may not 
coordinate on full cooperation because they may fail to coordinate their efforts with the others.  
We consider a leader-follower setting. Only one member of the group (the leader) observes the project 
scenario. The leader decides, before the rest of the group members, whether to invest in the project.  The leader then 
chooses between two information regimes:  transparent (i.e. revealing his decision and the return scenario) or not 
transparent (i.e. revealing his decision but not the return scenario).  
 
 
                                                 
1 In this paper, leaders, if they reveal information, must be truthful.  
2 There were two sessions of only six subjects due to low turnout.  
 
Table 1: Scenarios 1, (2), and 3 Payoffs  
 

























Given the leaders‟ investment decisions and information regime choices, the relevant information is 
conveyed to the followers. The followers then separately and simultaneously decide whether to invest in the project 
(followers do not know anything about the different information regimes). 
A total of 222 subjects participate in fifteen sessions with either six or 15 subjects per session.
3  Subjects 
are recruited to a common room (Room B).  After signing consent forms, one-third of the subjects are selected at 
random to be leaders and move to a second room (Room A).
4  Subjects are randomly and anonymously assigned to a 
three-person group (two from Room B and one from Room A).  Subjects are given instructions which a proctor 
reads aloud.  Room A instructions indicate that the leaders can reveal or not their groups‟ scenarios.  Room B 
instructions indicate that the followers may or may not be informed of their groups‟ scenario, but they will be 
informed of their leaders‟ investment decision.  Room B subjects do not know that the decision to not reveal the 
scenario was the Room A subject‟s choice.  
The information regarding a group‟s scenario, the leader‟s investment decision, and the leader‟s decision to 
reveal the scenario is emailed to Room B.  The appropriate information is relayed to the Room B followers.  After 
the followers make their decisions, independently and simultaneously, earnings are calculated and the information is 
emailed to Room A.  Subjects complete a short survey form to collect demographic information then paid in private 
and excused. 
  
3.  RESULTS 
 
Our primary interest is in the behavior of our leaders, whether they choose the transparent information 
regime.  If a leader holds transparency as a guiding principle, then his decision to be transparent should be 
independent of both his decision to invest and his group‟s scenarios.  Recall that the definition of transparency is to 
“… share all relevant information in a way that is timely and valid (Schwarz, 2010).  We therefore ignore the 
invest/not invest decision and define our null hypothesis as: A leader‟s transparency decision is independent of his 
group‟s scenario.   
Table 2 reports the transparency decisions of our leaders by scenario.
5  In both S1 and S3, the leader is better off 
removing any ambiguity.  Coordinating on either all investing (S1) or all not investing (S3) is facilitated by 
revealing information about the scenario. Being transparent when transparency can only help you is easy.  Not 
surprisingly, when transparency is beneficial (i.e. in S1 and S2), leaders opt for transparency; every leader but one, 
whether he invests or not, reveals to his followers his group‟s scenario. 
In S2, being transparent makes the leader vulnerable; followers, knowing that they are in S2, can increase 
their earnings at their leaders‟ expense by free riding and not investing.  Being transparent when transparency can 
hurt you is hard.  Our results suggest that, in S2, when transparency exposes the leader to being exploited, leaders 
 
 
                                                 
3 There were two sessions of six subjects and 14 sessions of 15 subjects. 
4 The Room A (B) subjects are not referred to as leaders (followers). 
5 The lower number in bold in each cell is the number not invest decisions.    
 
Table 2:  Leaders‟ Transparency, Decisions, and Not Invest Decisions by Scenarios 
 
Scenario  Transparent  Not Transparent 













are much less likely to opt for transparency.  Less than half (17/41) of all S2 leaders, regardless of their investment 
decision, choose transparency.  A χ
2 contingency table test rejects our null hypothesis (χ
2(3) = 32.9, p-value<0.001).  
In Table 3 we report how followers respond to their leaders‟ decisions to invest or not and to be transparent 
or not.  In S1 and S3, followers, with rare exceptions, follow they leaders‟ leads; if the leaders invest (do not invest),  
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they invest (do not invest).  In S2, when leaders do not invest, their decisions (to be transparent or not) do not 
appreciably influence their followers‟ decisions to invest or not.  Less than 20% of the followers invest regardless of 
the leaders‟ transparency decision (binomial proportions p-value = 0.546).   When leaders invest, being transparent 
gives followers the information needed to determine if free riding is in their best interest.  Our results suggest 
followers do exploit this information.  Two-thirds of the followers free ride on their leaders when their leader is 
transparent.  When the leader is not transparent, only 25% of the followers free ride.  This difference is significant 
(binomial proportions p-value=0.049). 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
In many real-world business and political environments, leaders have exclusive access to critical 
information and are in charge of deciding whether or not to reveal the details of their information and actions to their 
potential followers.  It is common for leaders in these circumstances to claim they value transparency and are in fact 
being transparent.  However, it is practically difficult for the followers to verify the real information or the leaders‟ 
actions.  This project tests experimentally whether or not leaders, when given a choice, actually reveal a preference 
for transparency. 
Our empirical results indicate that, when it is to their advantage (our S1 and S3), leaders are transparent.  
When transparency places leaders in a vulnerable position (our S2), leaders are significantly less inclined to be 
transparent.  Less than one-half of our leaders choose to be transparent in this scenario, and of those who did choose 
transparency, only one-half choose to invest, placing their selves in a position where they could be exploited by their 
followers.  
One interpretation of our results is that leaders in S2 do not expect their followers to follow them (and our 
evidence suggests their expectations are accurate).  Acting on this expectation, our S2 leaders either choose not to be 
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